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Le problème pour la sociocritique serait alors celui d'une spécificité du travail
fictionnel (poétique) par rapport aux énoncés qui traverse le texte. (Claude Duchet
Sociocritique 7)
In this article I will review some of the postulations and positions of authors who work in
the field of sociocritique / sociocriticism,1 as represented in a new book, edited by Jacques Neefs
and Marie-Claire Ropars, called La Politique du texte, enjeux sociocritiques: pour Claude Duchet
through a study of the initial question posed by Marc Angenot in the first chapter: “Que peut la
littérature?” Although this approach will unjustly play down the importance of some of the
contributions to this impressive volume, it will nonetheless allow for fruitful discussion about the
sociocritical approach, which is largely unknown to the English-speaking world except by reference
to Edmond Cros' journal Sociocriticism (out of the University of Pittsburgh) and his relatively
well-known book called Theory and Practice of Sociocriticism (originally published by CERS
Montpellier in 1983 as Théorie et pratique sociocritiques, and translated into English by Jerome
Schwartz for the University of Minnesota Press, 1988). Despite the value of Cros' approach, and the
notable importance of the Ulla and Jürgen Link's foreword to the English translation, Cros' work is
by no means representative of the broad range of sociocritical study or even the theoretical apparatus
which underpins it. Sociocriticism, or sociocritique, owes its origins and its development to Claude
Duchet (who is never cited in Cros' book!) and to the group of colleagues and disciples who have
been trained and/or influenced by him over the many years in which he has worked (his first
publication was in 1946, and his first use of “socio-critique” in one of his titles occurred in 1971
with the publication of “Pour une socio-critique ou variations sur un incipit,” in Littérature 1, 1971).
Duchet also edited, in 1979, another text called Sociocritique (Éditions Fernand Nathan), comprised
of the proceedings of a conference organized by NYU and Université de Paris-VIII. The list of
people inspired by this early volume on sociocritique (and other work by Duchet) is impressive if
the production of La politique du texte, which is a kind of recompense to Duchet (it comes complete
with an exhaustive list of Claude Duchet's publications and a bibliography of works on
sociocritique), is any indication. I count, on the list printed on page 279, 168 persons and institutions
involved with the project, including the likes of Marc Angenot, Jacques Dubois (who, along with
Jacques Leenhardt and Henri Meschonnic published texts in both the present volume and the 1979
study of sociocritique), Gérard Genette, Philippe Hamon, Henri Mitterand, Régine Robin, and so
forth. Most of the names on this list would not be familiar to an English-speaking audience, despite
the fact that the issues Duchet and his followers / colleagues are working on are contemporary and
urgent. This, if you will, is another of my interests for the purposes of this article, to review Duchet
et al.'s work and to relate it to theoretical issues of concern to an English speaking audience (and by
doing so trying to live up to a tradition, described by Ulla and Jürgen link in Theory and Practice
of Sociocriticism, in which Montreal (and citizens thereof) act(s) as “probably the most important
reception channel between the francophone world and the United States,” vii).
“Que peut la littérature?” “What can literature do?” “What is the status of literary
knowledge?” Before turning to Angenot's reply to these questions I'll set a provocative challenge
from Noam Chomsky, the well-known linguist and increasingly prominent political activist, whose
views of literature (and indeed of the social sciences) are sometimes surprising and provocative.
Why Chomsky? Because I feel that his political work, his approach to texts, and his commitment
to social amelioration based upon a vision of freedom, equality and rationality, is a welcome and
much-needed antidote to contemporary political theory and social science research, just as research
in sociocritique, with its insistence upon studies of social and textual relations, offers a much-needed
politically-useful theory of (literary) texts in an era of intellectual self-indulgence. And in my
opinion, a study of the differences and similarities in two approaches to literary knowledge as
apparently divergent as Chomsky's and Neefs/Ropars et al's, offers space for the aggrandizement
of both.
Chomsky the linguist seldom, if ever, speaks of literature (for obvious reasons, considering
his approach to language theory); and, again not surprisingly, Chomsky the political activist and
social thinker also has little or nothing to say about literary texts. Yet there is reason to study
Chomsky's overall approach to discourse as represented in both of his domains of interest for two
reasons. First, his reasoning concerning the production of texts per se is sometimes close to that of
Angenot's; and second, his comments are of particular interest in the context of a collection of
articles related to discourse analysis because Chomsky, like Angenot (who co-founded the
Inter-University Centre for Discourse Analysis and Text Sociocriticism), has done close textual
readings that fall (loosely) into the domain of discourse analysis, and he, like Angenot, has done
extensive study of various realms of discursive practice, notably propaganda. And finally, there is
a (tenuous) red thread here; Chomsky's mentor was Zelig Harris who Angenot describes, in
Glossaire pratique de la critique contemporaine (Montréal: Hurtubise HMH, 1979), as one of the
founders of discourse analysis research, through reference to Harris's 1963 monograph called
Discourse Analysis.2
There are slim pickings of Chomsky on literature, despite the massive corpus of Chomsky
texts and the potentially-related titles, such as Language and Responsibility, Language and Politics,
and Problems of Language and Freedom.3 There is, however, a valuable interview for our purposes
in The Chomsky Reader, which will serve as the basis for my preliminary remarks concerning the
role of the literary text in an analysis, and an interview with Mitsou Ronat in Language and
Responsibility which will serve as the basis for my discussions about dialogues concerning literature
(literary theory). James Peck, the editor of The Chomsky Reader, and the interviewer for the opening
discussion concerning Chomsky's personal background and cheminement, begins with a somewhat
cryptic but important question:
You've rarely written much on the kinds of experiences that led to your
politics, even though, it seems to me, they may have been deeply formed and
influenced by your background.... For example, I am struck by how seldom
you mention literature, culture, culture in the sense of a struggle to find
alternative forms of life through artistic means; rarely a novel that has
influenced you. Why is this so? Were there some works that did influence
you? (3)
Chomsky replies by stating that he rarely “writes about these matters” because they “don't
seem particularly pertinent to the topics I am addressing.” Literature affects him inasmuch as certain
notions “resonate” when he reads, but overall his “feelings and attitudes were largely formed prior
to reading literature.” “In fact,” says Chomsky, “I've been always resistant consciously to allowing
literature to influence my beliefs and attitudes with regard to society and history.” In sum, therefore,
literary renditions of social or political situations do not offer privileged information concerning the
actual events or the power structure with which Chomsky is concerned. However, he does admit that
literature can offer a far deeper insight into another realm of knowledge, the study of what James
Peck in this interview calls “the full human person.” In fact, according to Chomsky, literature
provides more insightful information about the full human person than does any mode of scientific
inquiry. This is a notable exception to Chomsky's adamant belief in the power and value of pure
sciences over social sciences, and is in accord with Mikhail Mikhailovitch Bakhtin's belief that
dialogism, which is most adequately expressed in the dialogic novel, is the only means to adequately
represent what he calls “the whole human being.” However, Chomsky is nonetheless reticent about
drawing “any tight connections” between literature and knowledge because he can't really say
whether literature has ever “changed [his] attitudes and understanding in any striking or crucial
way:”
[I]f I want to understand, let's say, the nature of China and its revolution, I
ought to be cautious about literary renditions. Look, there's no question that
as a child, when I read about China, this influenced my attitudes – Rickshaw
Boy, for example. That had a powerful effect when I read it. It was so long
ago I don't remember a thing about it, except the impact.... Literature can
heighten your imagination and insight and understanding, but it surely
doesn't provide the evidence that you need to draw conclusions and
substantiate conclusions. (4)
Literature from this standpoint does not necessarily reflect either the overall social discourse
of a given society or particular elements thereof, but rather is one of any number of means through
which one can gain knowledge. It is difficult (if not impossible due to variations depending upon
the person) to assess whether the attitudes developed by the reader with regards to a particular
subject preceded the reading of literary texts (thus allowing certain notions to “resonate”), or
whether the literary texts themselves helped form the attitudes (as Chomsky suggests in his
discussion of the role that literary texts played for him when he was a child). But the actual
relationship between literary knowledge and empirical facts is clearly problematic for Chomsky, to
the point where he “consciously” blocks out any effects that literary texts might have for his analysis
of particular situations. But as we'll see, this blockage of literary knowledge happens on the level
of methodology, and it does not imply that literary discourse has no role to play in describing the
contextual reality within which it is situated or read. In fact, it could be said of Chomsky's view that
one can learn from literature just as one can learn from life. How this occurs (in both cases) is
unclear; how one learns from life and how one learns from literature are processes that, at our level
of sophistication, cannot be easily described or evaluated. So, as Chomsky claims, literature has
been important for him, but he is not prepared to describe (what he considers to be) the
indescribable, -- the actual effect that literature has had upon his (or anybody else's) thinking.
Practitioners of sociocriticism, and I'll take as an example here the work of Marc Angenot,
address different concerns for their study of dialogue in or about literary texts; however by bringing
first Angenot's, and then other theoreticians, work to bear on issues posed by the Peck / Chomsky
interview helps clarify the relationship between literary discourse and the broad compendium of
social discourses uttered at a particular historical moment. In the first article of the recent book La
politique du texte, Angenot begins by posing several questions regarding the status of literary
knowledge: “What does literature do?” “What does literature know?” and, “What does literature
know that distinguishes it from other discursive practices?” These questions offer us the first
glimpse at the workings of sociocritique, since Angenot notes that a fundamental question for
sociocritical analysis is “que sait-elle [la littérature] qui ne se saurait pas ailleurs, dans les champs
discursifs publics ou ésotériques?” (10). Angenot seems to articulate Chomsky's position on this
question when he suggests that “que sait la littérature?” never refers to “connaissance propre et du
premier degré;” thus, he writes, “la question se précise...de la façon suivante: que sait la littérature
sur les manières dont les autres secteurs discursifs “connaissent" le monde et légitiment leurs
connaissances?" The ways in which it affects or describes other discursive realms (Angenot) and
attitudes (Chomsky) is by virtue of its qualities as literature; thus Angenot also asks about the
relationship between the form in literature (one of its distinguishing qualities) and the work that it
accomplishes within the overall social discourse. A study of this relationship, which is never raised
(except by inference) by Chomsky (i.e. “it was so long ago I don't remember a thing about it
[Rickshaw Boy], except the impact,” my emphasis) underlines, in Angenot's view, the specificity of
sociocriticism and the contribution that Claude Duchet has made to the field of literary studies. In
this regard Angenot emphasizes such Duchetian notions as the mise en texte of an aspect of social
discourse in the novel, and the sociogenèse du texte, which relates to the work that a text effects
upon its context, its absorption therein, and its distinctiveness as polyphonic discursive collage
within the broader practice of social discourse.
Sociocriticism, as a research project, helps to specify the nature of the “impact” (Chomsky)
that literature has upon the reader by pointing out its paradoxical roles, as on the one hand that
which proliferates (variously constituted fragments of) social discourse (by virtue of its intertextual
nature), and on the other (or by extension), that which challenges the broader compendium of social
discourse through its ability to juxtapose and articulate contradictory, uncomplimentary, or unrelated
fragments of a (presumed) whole ("carnivalization"), either in the present or in some undetermined
future ("une potentialité," which leads to a kind of “open-endedness”). What these roles have in
common with one another, and what they have in common with Chomsky's notions of “resonance”
and of an indeterminate “impact” effected upon the (situated) inquisitive reader, is that they actively
occur in the real world, as a kind of work that is effected through dialogic interaction. In this sense,
knowledge of a “deuxième degré” is similar to knowledge that resonates; both act upon the
experience of a socially situated interactant. I have bracketed Bakhtinian notions throughout this
paragraph -- “situatedness,” “intertextuality,” “chronotopic,” “carnivalization” “open-endedness”
and “dialogic” -- to draw attention to the strong Bakhtinian undercurrent in sociocritique and by
extension to use Bakhtin as a tentative point of contact between sometimes disparate issues.
Angenot thus insists that there are no immanent qualities to literature; and yet he does
bracket off literature from other discursive practices in the society. Chomsky too, who insists that
knowledge claims in social sciences must be grounded in similar verifiable criteria as that which is
set forth for pure sciences, is nonetheless ready to speak of literary texts as being able, in ways that
no scientific knowledge is, to describe or contribute to human experience. Thus Chomsky, who in
my experience generally speaks of concepts such as “attitude,” “impact,” “effect,” and “insight” in
ways that avoid murky intellectual obfuscation of the kind that is unfortunately common in
discussion of literary texts, does employ said terms without full explanation in his (brief) description
of literature. But whereas Chomsky claims to consciously resist allowing literature to affect his
beliefs and attitudes with regards to history and society and does not go beyond statements
suggesting that literature has a legitimate but undefinable claim to knowedge, Angenot insists upon
the need to elaborate “une théorie et une critique historique du discours social,” which would permit
us to study the literary text in a properly socialized setting, while underlining its paradoxical role
as both disseminator and subverter. This indeed leads us to a divergence between these two thinkers,
just as it lead to a divergence between Foucault and Chomsky during their debate on “human nature”
(televised on national television in Amsterdam and later transcribed for publication in a book about
human nature called Troubled Waters). Chomsky refuses to acknowledge the role that, say, rules
of social interaction (Angenot) or épistimé (Foubault), play in either of his two research domains
(his purely scientific study of linguistics and his “muckraking” studies of media and power relations
in contemporary American society) because he has never found any convincing evidence, beyond
intuition, that these rules exist. The elements of the “immense rumeur” that are of interest to
Angenot, “ses règles,” “ses topiques,” “ses rôles,” “sa rhétorique," “sa doxa,” “ses langages,” “ses
migrations thématiques,” and so forth, are present in language for Chomsky, but they act ostensibly
as (inaccessible) screens to our understanding of the facts that are obscured therein. Thus Chomsky
seeks to sift through the “immense rumeur” for objective truth or empirical facts with an
understanding that most of what is said has no value for the search for facts that can lead us to
conclusions useful for research purposes, while Angenot (like Foucault before him) sets forth the
compendium of social discourse as an interrelated whole and suggests that the kinds of scientific
knowledge sought within a particular context is to some degree coloured by the questions posed by
the overall social discourse and the discursive rules that underlie it. For Angenot, literary texts reveal
active discursive tendencies that could in some ways colour or even define what is deemed to be the
realm of science, while for Chomsky literature's relation thereto is, at best, unknowable. 
This is not extraneous for those who seek to sift through texts in search of objective data.
Certain texts, for Angenot, are declared to be literary according to an active paradigm of social
constraints and circumstances; “autrement dit, l'effet littérature ne peut être jugé et mesuré que par
rapport au système socio-discursif global dans lequel il s'engendre" (12). Substituting the word
“littérature” for “science” would I think be at least partially in accord with Angenot's vision (that
is, I think that 1+1=2 would remain scientific and for most purposes objective knowledge for
Angenot, whereas other “scientific claims” might not), whereas said substitution would undoubtedly
be rejected by Chomsky. One of Angenot's objectives is to de-fetishize literature, to place it into a
properly social realm; Chomsky, on the other hand, allows a special privilege to literature but
(presumably) feels that said contextualization would not enhance, and in fact would probably take
away from, the value of the literary text. On the other hand, Chomsky does, as I've said, claim
special status for scientific work which, although not identical to fetishization, could create similar
ideological problems under certain circumstances by virtue of, say, its being exempted from
discussions concerning ideological repercussions.
From this standpoint it is interesting to re-examine Duchet's view -- “on ne peut
véritablement penser l'histoire qu'à travers l'imaginaire” -- and Angenot's repudiation of fetishization
of literature -- “la littérature ne connaît pas le monde mieux que ne parviennent à le faire les autres
discours, elle connaît seulement, ou plutôt elle montre que les discours qui prétendent le connaître
et les humains qui humblement ou glorieusement s'y efforcent ne le connaissent vraiment pas” (19)
-- since they both suggest the modesty of our understanding and the limitation of any single vision
(including a scientific one). We need other persons to “fill in” for us, according to Bakhtin, for their
regard upon us allows for a more complete vision than a single (monologic) perspective. Part of the
process of “filling in” is undertaken by those who comment upon or attempt to contextualize literary
language and texts; but when Chomsky discusses this kind of research (socio-linguistics and literary
criticism) in Language and Responsibility, he once again resists the possibility that dialogue about
literature has any particular claim to explanatory principles.
A discipline is defined in terms of its objects and its results. Sociology is the
study of society. As to its results, its seems that there are few things one can
say about that, at least at a fairly general level. One finds observations,
intuitions, impressions, some valid generalizations perhaps. All very
valuable, no doubt, but not at the level of explanatory principles. Literary
criticism also has things to say, but it does not have explanatory principles.
Of course ever since the ancient Greeks people have been trying to find
general principles on which to base literary criticism, but while I'm far from
an authority in this field, I'm under the impression that no one has yet
succeeded in establishing such principles.... That is not a criticism. It is a
characterization, which seems to me to be correct. Sociolinguistics is, I
suppose, a discipline that seeks to apply principles of sociology to the study
of language; but I suspect that it can draw little from sociology, and I wonder
whether it is likely to contribute much to it.
Ronat replies that “in general one links a social class to a set of linguistic forms in a manner that is
almost bi-unique.” Chomsky replies:
You can also collect butterflies and make many observations. If you like
butterflies, that's fine; but such work must not be confounded with research,
which is concerned to discover explanatory principles of some depth and fails
if it does not do so. (57)
The first point here is that Chomsky is deriding literary criticism here, and not literature. His
remarks concerning literature suggest that we cannot know the kinds of effects that literature has
upon us (in any general sense at least), but his comments concerning literary theory, or for that
matter political science, sociology, or sociolinguistics, are more caustic because they, unlike
literature itself, wish to lay claim to a body of knowledge and explanatory principles. Here I think
is the basis of Chomsky's argument; literary theory cannot “know” anything in terms of explanatory
principles, and to look for such principles through the application of literary theory would be an
error. Some literary theorists, and I might add sociologists, political scientists, anthropologists and
so forth, cringe at Chomsky's derogatory descriptions of their work. They could, and often do, take
comfort in the belief that all knowledge domains, including pure science's claim to a monopoly on
explanatory principles, are culturally and socially contingent; Chomsky, for reasons I have already
noted, would not agree with this position. For Chomsky, literature does indeed know something,
about life, about the whole human person; but theoreticians working in the social sciences who make
reference to literary texts for their research (literary critics) only have a claim to knowledge useful
for explanatory principles when their research stands up to the scrutiny that scientific research
undergoes as a matter of course.
***
The way in which researchers articulate the socialized nature of knowledge is developed by
some of the articles in this volume; and for the balance of this article I shall bring other definitions
of sociocritique to bear upon issues raised by the present discussion, while providing summary
descriptions of some of the articles that complement or contradict perspectives articulated thus far.
One small point; it is difficult, or even unfair, to compare a whole school of thinking about texts
from a socialized approach with the small number of comments that Chomsky has made on the
subject, and in fact this is not my objective. What I am suggesting is that Chomsky's remarks
concerning literature and literary criticism do represent a point of view which, even when
represented by a few remarks, nonetheless stand as a useful criticism of, and (occasionally) a
complement to the sociocritical project.
In “Sociocritique et argumentation: L'exemple du discours sur le déracinement culturel dans
la nouvelle droite,” Ruth Amossy applies sociocriticism to the discursive tendencies of a political
movement in contemporary France. Her description of sociocriticism is in accord with that already
described, emphasizing the ways in which sociocriticism (when applied to literary texts, which is
its principal concern) privileges the transgression, the production of meaning through discourse, the
innovation, and the internal tensions or “mystification” (30) thereby elucidated. By attempting to
describe the relevance of sociocriticism for non-literary texts, she is attempting to both expand the
field of sociocritical study, while at the same time raising questions concerning the distinction
between literary and non-literary texts. By reading a chapter from Les Idées à l'endroit by Alain de
Benoist (Hallier, 1979) “comme un texte littéraire,” she suggests that this non-fictional text contains
elements of discursive practice best seen through the prism of sociocritical understanding. Thus in
this article she takes on the issue of how the rendering of ideas in text leads to the production of
formal elements that cannot be described with reference to content alone: 
Sera donc prise en charge, pour être vérifiée, l'hypothèse d'une socialité qui
se dit dans le travail interdiscursif, dans le recoupement ou la dialogisation
des savoirs, dans les réseaux textuels, dans l'investissement imaginaire et
mythique, dans les glissements de sens et les silences, autant sinon plus que
dans les contenus explicites. (31)
This in effect turns the question of “what does literature know?” into: “What does a rendering
literary do to the non-literary?” The question has admittedly been posed (though perhaps less
thoroughly) through reference to other-than-sociocritical analyses. The answer of course allows the
researcher to demonstrate that ideas are conveyed through formal, as well as semantic means, and
that a scientific mode of presentation (whether valid or not) provides a (potentially alarming)
semblance of rationality to a text. Chomsky has repeatedly asserted that claims to scientificity can
be verified; but, and this seems to me to be an extremely important point, the persuasive power of
such a text for an (uninitiated) reader cannot be nonetheless discounted. A related issue is raised in
Elisheva Rosen's “Le récit d'enfance” when she insists upon the construction of the genre (in this
case récit d'enfance), and the delimitation and circumscription of texts contained therein, as being
a part of the creative act that must be accounted for prior to a purely content-oriented analysis; or,
in the context of our earlier discussion concerning Chomsky's conscious decision to resist being
affected by a literary rendition of historical events, one of the decisions that we are forced to
confront is how a particular text can be written, and how it will be read. In this regard, I recall
Duchet's words in Sociocritique:
Le texte historise et socialise ce dont il parle, ce qu'il parle différemment; sa
cohérence esthétique (sa différence) est tributaire de conditions contingentes
du scriptible comme du lisible. D'autre part, il ne vit que par ce qu'il produit,
de lectures, d'effets, de réécritures. Il n'est pas à cet égard d'une autre nature
que ces objets divers, ponctuels et sériels, matériels et symboliques, dont
l'Histoire fait et refait incessamment son propre texte. (8)
Régine Robin's “Pour une socio-poétique de l'imaginaire social,” like Duchet's 1979 text
“Positions et perspectives,” is a kind of mise-à-jour, demystification and demarcation of
sociocriticism, and a discussion concerning the role of the “imaginaire” (a word that reappears with
notable frequency in Duchet's writings) for sociocritique. Duchet began his 1979 text by stating that,
in light of the multiplicity of research undertaken in the name of sociocritique or sociocriticism, “il
serait présomptueux de vouloir présenter ici un ensemble doctrinal” (3); and Robin begins by stating
that during a period of cultural amnesia, “il serait bon de commencer par rappeler les origines de la
sociocritique ou plus exactement les origines du questionnement sociocritique.” In short, there is a
kind of sociocritical approach to sociocritique / sociocriticism that is remarkable in both articles.
Robin's text is particularly important in light of our present discussion for several reasons.
First, she recalls and clarifies fundamental notions of sociocritique already named; second, she
places sociocritique into a relation with pertinent theories of the novel and of discursive interchange
-- Bakhtin, Goldmann, Macherey, Bourdieu, Lukács, and so forth. Third, she sets out to study the
relationship between the text and its surroundings -- the co-texte and the hors-texte. But I am
particularly interested here in a fourth point, her insistence upon the unique and privileged position
of the novel within the traffic of ideas, images, forms, stereotypes, and discursive configurations,
and her portrayal of the novel as a locus upon or through which the fluid memory and imagination,
and that great “rumeur globale” of social discourse, become crystallized (part of a larger discussion
of Duchet's sociogramme). The effect upon the imagination of this crystallization gives strong
impetus for studying the social aspects of the novel and the role of the novel as purveyor and
reservoir of images:
Un Gavroche, un Rastignac, un Frédéric Moreau, certaines scènes
emblématiques... peuplent notre imaginaire aussi fortement que les gravures
des manuels scolaires, que nos souvenirs personnels ou que des personnages,
des scènes, des lieux historiques. Le roman a été une sorte de réservoir
d'images, de phrases, de mots, de situations, de modèles narratifs, un foyer
culturel très puissant (95).
Looking back to Chomsky, we find a notable degree of indifference with regards to the
specifics of this reservoir of images; when Peck says to Chomsky: “you have rarely written much
on the kinds of experiences that led to your politics, even though...they may have been deeply
formed and influenced by your background” Chomsky replies that “I've not thought about it a great
deal.” When the question of the novel Rickshaw Boy comes up with respect to a discussion of China,
Chomsky says that he doesn't “remember a thing about it, except the impact.” When pushed on
whether literature can sensitize someone “to areas of human experience otherwise not even asked
about,” Chomsky replies that “people certainly differ, as they should, in what kinds of things make
their minds work” (4).
For Chomsky, there is no rich homogenous reservoir of intact memories which are or are not
open-ended, because the reservoir itself is not filled with a homogeneous liquid that dissolves all
elements in the same way, and even if there was it would only be interesting inasmuch as it could
help us understand how the mind “works,” a capacity which we are nowhere near finding out at this
point in our evolution.  For Robin, the reservoir is, by nature of its “socialité,” subject to changes
across time whereby “le texte produit un sens nouveau, transforme le sens qu'il croit simplement
inscrire, déplace le régime de sens, produit du nouveau à l'insu même de son auteur; tout le non-dit,
l'impensé, l'informulé, le refoulé entraînent des dérapages, des ratés, des disjonctions, des
contradictions, des blancs à partir desquels un sens nouveau émerge” (96, a notion similar to
Bakhtin's open-endedness). Far from being incompatible with Chomsky's own reading of certain
images from the past, Robin may in fact be offering an explanation for Chomsky's statements, based
upon reference to the moment in which these texts are recuperated for re-examination. “What can
literature do?” can be expanded once again, this time to include: “What can knowing what literature
can do tell us about who is doing it?” She is also trying to explain this phenomena of literature, and
providing reasons why it might be set aside from other forms of discursive practice within the
society.
Other articles in the volume expand upon and clarify a sociocritical approach to text and
society. Jacques Neefs, in “L'Investigation romanesque, une poétique des socialités,” writes about
the transformation of relations effected by the novel; in his sense, the novel knows about ambiguity,
construction, transformation and transmission through language, and as such knows about discursive
genres and the reality they attempt to portray. Neefs lays the emphasis here upon the rejuvenating
qualities of the novel, optimistically suggesting that “quand toute forme de communauté semble
perdue, la pensée et les oeuvres désignent une réalité encore à naître, dans la simple affirmation que
la communauté continue, dans les signes qu'elle procure pour l'identification d'une parole, par les
tentatives de configurations nouvelles qu'elle tend et offre pour que soit reconnu de l'intelligible”
(187). Georges Benrekassa, in “L'oeuvre, sans idéologie,” takes issue with Adorno's postulation
from Prisms, that “l'oeuvre réussie n'est pas celle qui réconcilie les contradictions objectives dans
une harmonie illusoire, mais plutôt celle qui exprime négativement l'idée d'harmonie en donnant
forme aux contradictions, de façon pure et intransigeante, jusqu'au coeur de sa structure,” so that “le
verdict d'idéologie pure et simple perd son sens” (189). By suggesting instead that any attempt at
isolating ideology in a doxological code is inevitably overly-reductive (a criticism, it seems to me,
of the sociocritique agenda), Benrekassa proposes to envision the text outside of ideology so as to
(paradoxically) enrich the notion of ideology through reference to the complexity of the text. These
two articles, like numerous others in this volume, relate by inference only to the subject of my earlier
discussion, but nonetheless deserve considerable attention. Other examples include Jacques Dubois'
“L'institution du texte,” an analysis of the relationship between the study of the sociology of textual
production and sociocriticism, which adds to other remarks concerning the role and the place of the
text in society; Robert Morrissey's “Le Gaulois errant d'Eugène Sue,” which postulates that
sociocriticism finds a natural subject domain in studies of the relationship between culture and
society, political practice and writing, and history and literature, as elucidated in the relationship
between ethnicity and nationalism; Thomas Pavel's “Thématique et politique,” which describes the
revival in the United States of (highly subjective) thematic study of literary texts (the subject of a
new book by Werner Sollors called The Return of Thematic Criticism, Harvard UP), and the relation
thereof to political engagement. Henri Meschonnic completes the volume with further study of the
relations between language, literature and society in “D'une poétique du rythme à une politique du
rythme” and in doing so brings to bear the force of sociocritique, vis-à-vis the work of Chomsky and
vis-à-vis cultural study in general:
La critique prend alors une valeur double. Elle est la mise en évidence d'une
implication réciproque entre des éléments traditionnellement tenus pour
séparés, autonomes. Elle est la mise en évidence du caractère radicalement
historique des valeurs. Les deux ne sont qu'une même découverte et
exploration du système que font une langue et sa littérature, une langue et sa
société, mais aussi une poétique et une éthique, une poétique et le politique.
(203)
Meschonnic provocatively underlines the paradox of poetics -- “comme critique, comme
reconnaissance du rôle central de la théorie du langage, et comme critique du signe par la critique
du rythme,” (204-5) -- as a utopia, a utopia in the sense of its necessity, and of its unfeasability in
a world so structured. 
Overall, the new addition tothe field of sociocritique, La Politique du texte, is a valuable
contribution to literary studies which, in my view, offers a long-awaited clarification of the entire
field of literary studies. By emphasizing the thoroughly socialized nature of any text, the authors
contribute to a properly communal nature of language and a concurrent de-fetishization of
Literature, while nonetheless allowing literary texts to propose or offer the space for contemplating
another set of reality principles; and by questioning the position and the sanctity of literary texts
within this discursive community, these authors offer valuable insights into aspects of our reading
of literary texts even if, as Chomsky points out, these texts do not have claim to a clearly-definable
realm of knowledge useful for drawing conclusions or deriving explanatory principles.
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Notes
1. There is discussion concerning the relationship between these two terms, despite the fact that they
should simply be the French and English versions of the same practice, since one of them is studied
in the context of the United States and the other in France. I will not take up this issue here; when
I use “sociocriticism” I am translating “sociocritique.”
2. This early definition was from a linguistic perspective; Harris was interested in the “pattern of
occurrence (ie. a recurrence) of segments of discourse [ie. utterances, parts of sentences, words, parts
of words which constitute a “whole constituent or a sequence of constituents; where a constituent,
for language, is a segment of a sentence resulting from any grammatical analysis of the sentence"]
relative to each other," and as such concentrated upon the structure in discourse which can be
studied without reference to other information, such as the pattern or relations of meanings in the
discourse (Discourse 7).
3. Noam Chomsky, Language and Politics (Montréal: Black Rose, 1988); Language and
Responsibility: Based on Conversations with Mitsou Ronat, Trans. John Viertel (New York:
Pantheon, 1979); Problems of Knowledge and Freedom (New York: Vintage, 1972).
